homelab-codex-ws/kb/services/kb-site.md

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---
okf: "0.1"
type: service
visibility: public
status: active
updated: 2026-08-05
links:
- ../runbooks/kb-site-deploy.md
---
# kb-site
Public slice of this knowledge base, served as static HTML from a deliberately
non-obvious subdomain of `okit.pl`.
Plain `nginx:alpine` on the PIHA node reading one Docker named volume — no
build step at runtime, no database, no dependencies.
The site is a rendering, not a source. Every page is generated from the
Markdown documents of the knowledge base by `scripts/kb/gen_pages.py` and
copied into the volume; the HTML is never edited by hand and never committed.
## What gets published
Only documents that carry an explicit `visibility: public` field in their
frontmatter. The generator is **fail-closed**: a document with no frontmatter,
with unparseable frontmatter, with no `visibility` field, or with any other
value is treated as private and stays out of the build.
The same rule applies to cross-references. A link pointing at a document that
was not published is not rendered as a link — only the label survives, marked
`[private]`. A public page therefore never exposes the location of an internal
document and never produces a dead link.
Frontmatter shown on a page is deliberately partial: type, status and the last
update date. The `links` field is omitted, because a path to a private document
is already a leak of its name.
## Structure of the build
```
build/kb-site/
index.html list of all published documents, grouped by type
<directory>/<name>.html one page per document, mirroring the source tree
```
Each page carries a footer with the generation timestamp and the short commit
hash of the repository state it was rendered from, so any page can be traced
back to an exact revision.
## Leak gate
`gen_pages.py --check` re-reads the generated HTML — not the sources — and
fails on anything that looks like infrastructure detail leaking into a public
page: private, carrier-grade and public IP addresses (v4 and v6), high service
port numbers, absolute host paths, and long hex or base64 strings that look
like credentials. Deliberate exceptions live in a whitelist file that starts
out empty, so every exception is a recorded decision.
The check is a release gate: content is copied to the host only after it
passes.
## Access
Three layers keep the site out of casual sight: a query-parameter token enforced
in the nginx/NPM layer (advanced config held in NPM only — the secret is not in
this repository), an unguessable subdomain, and `noindex, nofollow` on every page
alongside a blanket `robots.txt`.
This is obscurity, not access control. A URL token is written to access logs,
browser history and outbound `Referer` headers, so anyone who obtains a link
keeps it; nothing here resists a deliberate attacker. The leak gate above, not
this, is what keeps private material off the site.
## Operations
Deployment, content refresh, reverse-proxy and DNS setup are described in the
[kb-site deployment runbook](../runbooks/kb-site-deploy.md), which is internal —
on this site the reference above is plain text, exactly as described in the
previous section.
## Content lifetime
The volume holds an artifact, not data. There is no backup job — recovery is a
regeneration from the repository. Because the generator writes a fresh tree on
every run and the publish step replaces the volume contents wholesale, a
document that flips from public to private disappears from the site on the next
publish.