homelab-codex-ws/kb/services/kb-site.md

---
okf: "0.1"
type: service
visibility: public
status: active
updated: 2026-08-05
links:
  - ../runbooks/kb-site-deploy.md
---

# kb-site

Public slice of this knowledge base, served as static HTML from a deliberately
non-obvious subdomain of `okit.pl`.
Plain `nginx:alpine` on the PIHA node reading one Docker named volume — no
build step at runtime, no database, no dependencies.

The site is a rendering, not a source. Every page is generated from the
Markdown documents of the knowledge base by `scripts/kb/gen_pages.py` and
copied into the volume; the HTML is never edited by hand and never committed.

## What gets published

Only documents that carry an explicit `visibility: public` field in their
frontmatter. The generator is **fail-closed**: a document with no frontmatter,
with unparseable frontmatter, with no `visibility` field, or with any other
value is treated as private and stays out of the build.

The same rule applies to cross-references. A link pointing at a document that
was not published is not rendered as a link — only the label survives, marked
`[private]`. A public page therefore never exposes the location of an internal
document and never produces a dead link.

Frontmatter shown on a page is deliberately partial: type, status and the last
update date. The `links` field is omitted, because a path to a private document
is already a leak of its name.

## Structure of the build

```
build/kb-site/
  index.html            list of all published documents, grouped by type
  <directory>/<name>.html   one page per document, mirroring the source tree
```

Each page carries a footer with the generation timestamp and the short commit
hash of the repository state it was rendered from, so any page can be traced
back to an exact revision.

## Leak gate

`gen_pages.py --check` re-reads the generated HTML — not the sources — and
fails on anything that looks like infrastructure detail leaking into a public
page: private, carrier-grade and public IP addresses (v4 and v6), high service
port numbers, absolute host paths, and long hex or base64 strings that look
like credentials. Deliberate exceptions live in a whitelist file that starts
out empty, so every exception is a recorded decision.

The check is a release gate: content is copied to the host only after it
passes.

## Access

Three layers keep the site out of casual sight: a query-parameter token enforced
in the nginx/NPM layer (advanced config held in NPM only — the secret is not in
this repository), an unguessable subdomain, and `noindex, nofollow` on every page.

A blanket `robots.txt` was part of this and has been withdrawn. It turned away
every client that honours robots.txt — including the fetch tools of AI
assistants — even when the caller already held the access token, so it pushed
out precisely the readers the token exists to let in. It also worked against its
own goal: a crawler blocked before it can read the page never sees the `noindex`
tag, and a search engine may still list a bare URL it was forbidden to fetch.

This is obscurity, not access control. A URL token is written to access logs,
browser history and outbound `Referer` headers, so anyone who obtains a link
keeps it; nothing here resists a deliberate attacker. The leak gate above, not
this, is what keeps private material off the site.

## Operations

Deployment, content refresh, reverse-proxy and DNS setup are described in the
[kb-site deployment runbook](../runbooks/kb-site-deploy.md), which is internal —
on this site the reference above is plain text, exactly as described in the
previous section.

## Content lifetime

The volume holds an artifact, not data. There is no backup job — recovery is a
regeneration from the repository. Because the generator writes a fresh tree on
every run and the publish step replaces the volume contents wholesale, a
document that flips from public to private disappears from the site on the next
publish.